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Introduction
The allocation of resources is an all-pervasive theme in economics. And, I think it is no exaggeration to say that the question of whether there exist mechanisms ensuring efficient allocation--i.e., mechanisms that ensure that resources wind up in the hands of those who value them most--is of central importance in the discipline. Indeed, the very word "economics" connotes a preoccupation with the issue of efficiency.
But economists' interest in efficiency does not end with the question of existence. If efficient mechanisms can be constructed, we want to know what they look like and to what extent they might resemble institutions used in practice.
Understandably, the question of what will constitute an efficient mechanism has been a major concern of economic theorists going back to Adam Smith. But the issue is far from just a theoretical one. It is also of considerable practical importance. This is particularly clear when it comes to privatization, the transfer of assets from the state to the private sector.
In the last fifteen years or so, we have seen a remarkable flurry of privatizations in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and highly industrialized Western nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. An important justification for these transfers has been the expectation that they will improve efficiency. But if efficiency is the rationale, an obvious leading question to ask is: "What sorts of transfer mechanisms will best advance this objective?" One possible and, of course, familiar answer is "The Market." We know from the First Theorem of Welfare Economics (see Debreu (1959) ) that, under certain conditions, the competitive mechanism (the uninhibited exchange and production of goods by buyers and sellers) results in an efficient allocation. A major constraint on the applicability of this result to the circumstances of privatization, however, is the theorem's hypothesis of large numbers. For the competitive mechanism to work properly--to avoid the exercise of monopoly power--there must be sufficiently many buyers and sellers so that no single agent has an appreciable effect on prices. But privatization often entails small numbers. In the recent U.S. "spectrum" auctions--the auctions in which the government sold rights (in the form of licenses) to use certain radio frequency bands for telecommunications--there were often only two or three serious bidders for a given license. The competitive model does not seem readily applicable to such a setting.
An interesting alternative possibility was raised by William Vickrey forty years ago (Vickrey (1961) ). Vickrey showed that, if a seller has a single indivisible good for sale, a second-price auction (see Section 2) is an efficient mechanism-i.e., the winner is the buyer whose valuation of the good is highest-in the case where buyers have private values ("private values" mean that no buyer's private information affects any other buyer's valuation). This finding is rendered even more significant by the fact that it can readily be extended to the sale of multiple goods 1 , as shown by Theodore Groves (Groves (1973) ) and Edward Clarke (Clarke (1971) ).
Unfortunately, once the assumption of private values is dropped and thus buyers' valuations do depend on other buyers' information (i.e., we are in the world of common 2 or interdependent values), the second-price auction is no longer efficient, as I will illustrate by means of an example
below. Yet, the common-values case is the norm in practice. If, say, a telecommunications firm undertakes a market survey to forecast demand for cell phones in a given region, the results of the survey will surely be of interest to its competitors and thus turn the situation into one of common values.
Recently, a literature has developed on the design of efficient auctions in common-values settings. The time is not yet ripe for a survey; the area is currently evolving too rapidly for that. But I would like to take this opportunity to discuss a few of the ideas from this literature.
The Basic Model
Because it is particularly simple, I will begin with the case of a single indivisible good. Later I will argue that much (but not all) of what holds in the one-good case extends to multiple goods.
Suppose that there are n potential buyers. It will be simplest to assume that they are riskneutral (however, we can accommodate any other attitude toward risk if the model is specialized to the case in which there is no residual uncertainty about valuations when all buyers' information is pooled). Assume that each buyer i's private information about the good can be summarized by a realvalued signal. That is, buyer i's information is reduceable to a one-dimensional parameter. 2 I am using "common values" in the broad sense to cover any instance where one agent's payoff depends on another's information. The term is sometimes used narrowly to mean that all agents share the same payoff. 3 Later on I will examine the case of multidimensional signals. As with multiple goods, much will generalize. As we will see, the most problematic case is that in which there are both multiple goods and multidimensional signals.
In this case, we are in the world of private values, not the interesting setting from the perspective of this lecture, but a valid special case.
A more pertinent example is:
Example 2: Suppose that the true value of the good to buyer i is y i , which, in turn, is the sum of a value component that is common to all buyers and a component that is peculiar to buyer i. That is, where ε i is the noise term, and all the random variables--z, the z i 's, and the ε i 's--are independent. In this case every buyer j's signal s j provides information to buyer i about his valuation, because s j is correlated (via (2) ) with the common component z. Hence we can express ( )
where the right-hand side of (3) denotes the expectation of y i conditional on the signals ( )
This second example might be kept in mind as representative of the sort of scenario that the analysis is intended to apply to.
Auctions
An auction in the model of Section 2 is a mechanism (alternatively termed a "game form" or "outcome function") that, on the basis of the bids submitted, determines (i) who wins (i.e., who--if anyone--is awarded the good), and (ii) how much each buyer pays 4 . Let us call an auction efficient provided that, in equilibrium, buyer i is the winner if and only if
(this definition is slightly inaccurate because of the possibility of ties for highest valuation, an issue that I shall ignore). In other words, efficiency demands that, in an equilibrium of the auction, the winner be the buyer with the highest valuation, conditional on all available information (i.e., on all buyers' signals).
This notion of efficiency is sometimes called ex-post efficiency. It assumes implicitly that the social value of the good being sold equals the maximum of the potential buyers' individual valuations. This assumption would be justified if, for example, each buyer used the good (e.g., a spectrum license) to produce an output (e.g., telecommunication service) that is sold in a competitive market without significant externalities (market power or externalities might drive a wedge between individual and social values).
The reader may wonder why, even if one wants efficiency, it is necessary to insist that the auction itself be efficient. After all, the buyers could always retrade afterwards if the auction resulted in a winner with less than the highest valuation. The problem with relying on post-auction trade, however, is much the same as that plaguing competitive exchange in the first place: these mechanisms do not in general work efficiently when there are only a few traders. To see this, consider the following example 5 :
Example 3: Suppose that there are two buyers. Assume that buyer 1 has won the auction and has a valuation of 1. If the auction is not guaranteed to be efficient, then there is some chance that buyer 2's valuation is higher. Suppose that, from buyer 1's perspective, buyer 2's valuation is distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 2] . Now, if there is to be further trade after the auction, someone has to initiate it. Let us assume that buyer 1 does so by proposing a trading price to buyer 2. Presumably, buyer 1 will propose a price p * that maximizes his expected payoff, i.e., that solves
(To understand (*) note that ( )
is the probability that the proposal is accepted-since it is the probability that buyer 2's valuation is at least p-and that p−1 is buyer 1's net gain in the event of 6 It is easy to show that the "first-price" auction-the auction in which each buyer makes a bid, the high bidder wins, and the winner pays his bid-is a nonstarter as far as efficiency is concerned. Indeed, even in the case of private values, the first-price auction is never efficient except when buyers' valuations are symmetrically distributed (see Maskin (1992) and so buyer 2 is the efficient winner. Thus the efficient allocation between buyers 1 and 2 turns on whether s 3 is below or above 1. But in a Vickrey auction, the bids made by buyers 1 and 2 cannot incorporate information about s 3 since that signal is private information to buyer 3. Thus the outcome of the auction cannot in general be efficient.
An Efficient Auction
How should we respond to the shortcomings of the Vickrey auction as illustrated by Example 3?
One possible reaction is to appeal to classical mechanism-design theory. Specifically, we could have each buyer i announce a signal value , i s award the good to the buyer i for whom ( )
is highest, and choose the winner's payment so as to evoke truth-telling in buyers, i.e., so as to induce each buyer j to set j ŝ equal to his true signal value .
j s
The problem with such a "direct revelation" mechanism is that it is utterly unworkable in practice. In particular, notice that it requires the mechanism designer to know the physical signal spaces , , ,
v , and the prior distributions of the signals--an extraordinarily demanding constraint. Now, the mechanism designer could attempt to elicit this information from the buyers themselves using the methods of the implementation literature (see Palfrey (1993) To avoid these complications, I shall concentrate on auction rules that do not make use of such details as signal spaces, functional forms, and distributions. Indeed, I will be interested in auctions that work well irrespective of these details, that is, I will adhere to the "Wilson Doctrine" (after Robert Wilson, who has been an eloquent proponent of the view that auction institutions should be "detail-free"). It turns out that a judicious modification of the Vickrey auction will do the trick.
Before turning to the modification, however, I need to introduce a restriction on valuation functions that is critical to the possibility of constructing efficient auctions. Let us assume that
, , all and and all for
In words, condition (5) says that buyer i's signal has a greater marginal effect on his own valuation than on that of any other buyer j (at least at points where buyer i's and buyer j's valuations are equal).
Notice that, in view of (1), condition (5) 8 is automatically satisfied by Example 1 (the case of private values): the right-hand side of the inequality then simply vanishes. Condition (5) also holds for Example 2. This is because, in that example, s i conveys relevant information to buyer j(≠i) about the common component z but tells buyer i not only about z but also his idiosyncratic component z i.
Thus, v i will be more sensitive than v j to variations in s i .
But whether or not condition (5) is likely to be satisfied, it is, in any event, essential for efficiency. To see what can go wrong without it, consider the following example. 
Observe that ( ) ( ) 
there is not enough oil to justify drilling at all). Driller 2, by contrast, should get the rights when s 1 > 1.
In this example, there is no way (either through a modified Vickrey auction or otherwise) of inducing driller 1 to reveal the true value s 1 in order to allocate drilling rights efficiently. To see this,
consider, without loss of generality, a direct revelation mechanism and let ( ) 
(the left-hand side is his payoff when he is truthful, whereas the right-hand side is his payoff when he pretends that 
Subtracting (8) from (7), we obtain
a contradiction of (6). Hence there exists no efficient mechanism.
The feature that interferes with efficiency in this example is the violation of condition (5), i.e., the fact that
Inequalities (1) and (9) imply that, as s 1 rises, drilling rights become more valuable to driller 1 but increasingly more likely, from the standpoint of efficiency, to be awarded to driller 2. This conflict makes the task of providing proper incentives for driller 1 impossible.
Assuming henceforth that (5) holds, let us reconfront the task of designing an efficient auction. In Example 4 we saw that the Vickrey auction failed because buyers 1 and 2 could not incorporate pertinent information about buyer 3 in their bids (since s 3 was private information). This suggests that, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , a natural way of amending the Vickrey auction would be to allow buyers to make contingent bids-bids that depend on other buyers' valuations. In We would then look for a fixed point
and install buyer 1 as the winner if and only if .
To understand the rationale for (10) and (11), imagine that buyers bid truthfully. Since signals are private information and thus buyer 1 will not in general know his own valuation, truthful bidding means that, if his signal value is s 1 , he submits a schedule ( ) ( )
That is, whatever ) hence (and 2 2 v s′ turns out to be, buyer 1 bids his true valuation for that signal value. Similarly, truthful bidding for buyer 2 with signal value s 2 means reporting schedule
Observe that if buyers bid according to (12) and (13) In view of (10) and (11), this means that if buyers are truthful, the auction will result in an efficient allocation. Thus, the remaining critical issue is how to get buyers to bid truthfully. For this 9 I noted in my arguments against direct revelation mechanisms that buyer 1 most likely will not know buyer 2's signal space S 2 . But this in no way should prevent him from understanding how his own valuation is related to that of buyer 2, which is what (12) is really expressing ( i.e., (12) still makes sense even if buyer 1 does not know what values 2 s′ can take). 10 Without further assumptions on valuation functions, there could be additional-non-truthful-fixed points. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Eso and Maskin (2000a) provide conditions to rule such fixed points out. But even if they are not ruled out, the auction rules can be modified so that, in equilibrium, the truthful fixed point results (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ).
purpose, it is useful to recall the device that the Vickrey auction exploits to induce truthful bidding, viz., to make the winner's payment equal, not to his own bid, but to the lowest possible bid he could have made and still have won the auction. This trick cannot be exactly replicated in our setting because buyers are submitting schedules rather than single bids. But let us try to take it as far as it will go. Suppose that when buyers repeat the schedules ( ) ( ) ( ) 
This payment rule, I maintain, is the common-values analog of the Vickrey trick in the sense that * 1 v is the lowest constant bid (i.e., the lowest uncontingent bid) that buyer 1 could make and still win (or tie for winning) given buyer 2's bid ( ). (14) and (15), it is an equilibrium for buyers to bid truthfully. To see this most easily, let us make use of a strengthened version of (5) 
regardless of how he bids (since neither his valuation nor his payment depends on his bid). I claim that if buyer 1 bids truthfully, then he wins if and only if (17) is positive. Observe that if this claim is established, then I will in fact have shown that truthful bidding is optimal; because buyer 1's bid does not affect (17), the most he can possibly hope for is to win precisely in those cases where the net payoff from winning is positive.
To see that the claim holds, let us first differentiate (13) 
Hence (17) is positive if and only if ( ) ( )
which, since ( ) An attractive feature of the Vickrey auction in the case of private values is that bidding one's true valuation is optimal regardless of the behavior of other buyers, i.e., it is a dominant strategy.
Once we abandon private values, however, there is no hope of finding an efficient mechanism with dominant strategies (this is because, if my payoff depends on your signal, then my optimal strategy necessarily depends on the way that your strategy reflects your signal value, and so is not independent of what you do). Nevertheless, equilibrium in our modified Vickery auction has a strong robustness property. In particular, notice that although, technically, truthful bidding constitutes only a Bayesian (rather than dominant-strategy) equilibrium, equilibrium strategies are independent of the prior distribution of signals F. That is, regardless of buyers' prior beliefs about signals, they will behave the same way in equilibrium. In particular, this means that the modified Vickrey auction will be efficient even in the case in which buyers' signals are believed to be independent of one another.
11
One might complain that having a buyer make his bid a function of the other buyer's valuation imposes a heavy informational burden on him-what if he doesn't know anything about the connection between the other's valuation and his own? I would argue, however, that the modified Vickrey auction should be viewed as giving buyers an additional opportunity rather than as setting an onerous requirement. After all, the degree to which a buyer makes his bid contingent is entirely up to him. In particular, he always has the option of bidding entirely uncontingently , i.e., of submitting a constant function. Thus, contingency is optional (but, of course, the degree to which the modified Vickrey auction will be more efficient than the ordinary Vickrey will turn on the extent to which buyers are prepared to bid contingently).
11 Crémer and McLean (1988) exhibit a mechanism that attains efficiency if the joint distribution of signals is common knowledge (including to the auction designer) and exhibits correlation. In very recent work A. Postlewaite has shown how this mechanism can be generalized to the case where the auction designer himself does not know the joint distribution. (1) and (5), an argument similar to the two-buyer demonstration above establishes that it is an equilibrium in this auction for each buyer to bid truthfully (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ) 12 . That is, if buyer i's signal value is s i , he should set
Furthermore, it is easy to see that, if buyers bid truthfully, the auction results in an efficient allocation.
One drawback of the modified Vickrey auction that I have exhibited is that a buyer must report quite a bit of information (this is an issue distinct from that of the buyer's having to know a great deal, discussed above)--a bid for each possible vector of valuations that others may have. Perry and Reny (1999a) have devised an alternative modification of the Vickrey auction that considerably reduces the complexity of the buyer's report. 12 The reader may wonder whether, when (5) is not satisfied and so an efficient auction may not be possible, the efficiency of the final outcome could be enhanced by allowing buyers to retrade after the auction is over. However, any post-auction trading episode could alternatively be viewed as part of a single mechanism that embraces both it and the auction proper. That is, in our search for efficient auctions, we need not consider postauction trade since such activity could always be folded into the auction itself. Indeed, permitting post-auction trade can, in principle interfere with efficiency in the same way that renegotiation can interfere with the efficiency of a contract (see Dewatripont (1989) 
, in which case (22) is not well defined. To see how to handle that possibility see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) .
Specifically, the Perry-Reny auction consists of two rounds of bidding. This means that a buyer can make his second-round bid depend on whatever he learned about other buyers' valuations from their first-round bids, and so the auction avoids the need to report bid schedules. Perry and Reny show that, under assumption (1) and (5) and provided that the probability a buyer has a zero valuation is zero, there exists an efficient equilibrium of this auction. They also demonstrate that the auction can be readily extended to the case in which multiple identical goods are sold, provided that a buyer's marginal utility from additional units is declining.
The English Auction
The reader may wonder why, in my discussion of efficiency, I have not brought up the English auction, the familiar open format in which (i) buyers call out bids publicly (with the proviso that each successive bid exceed the one before), (ii) the winner is the last buyer to make a bid, and (iii) the winner pays his bid. After all, the opportunity to observe other buyers' bids in the English auction would seem to allow a buyer to make a conditional bid in the same way that the modified Vickrey auction does.
However, as shown in Maskin (1992) , Eso and Maskin (2000b) and Krishna (2000) , the English auction is not efficient in as wide a class of cases as the modified Vickrey auction. To see this, let us consider a variant of the English auction, sometimes called the "Japanese" auction (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) ), which is particularly convenient analytically: ( i) all buyers are initially in the auction;
(ii) the auctioneer raises the price continuously starting from zero; (iii) a buyer can drop out (publicly) at any time;
( iv) the last buyer remaining wins; (v) the winner pays the price prevailing when the penultimate buyer dropped out. Now, in this auction, a buyer can indeed condition his drop-out point according to when other buyers have dropped out, allowing bids in effect to be conditional on other buyers' valuations. However, a buyer can condition only on buyers who have already dropped out. Thus, for efficiency, buyers must drop out in the "right" order in the equilibrium. That this might not happen is illustrated by the following example from Eso and Maskin (2000a) (1) and (5) , and this function is decreasing in s. So, in equilibrium buyers will not drop out in the right order. We conclude that the English auction does not have an efficient equilibrium in this example.
In Example 6 each buyer's valuation is decreasing in the other buyer's signal. Indeed, this feature is important: as Maskin (1992) shows, the English auction is efficient in the case n=2 when valuations are nondecreasing functions of signals (and conditions (1) and (5) hold). However, examples due to Perry and Reny (1999b) , Krishna (2000) , and Eso and Maskin (2000b) demonstrate that this result does not extend to more than two buyers. Nevertheless, Krishna (2000) provides some interesting conditions (considerably stronger than the juxtaposition of (1) and (5)) under which the English auction is efficient with three or more buyers (see also Eso and Maskin (2000b) ). Moreover, the Perry and Reny paper shows that the English auction can be modified (in a way analogous to their (1999b) alteration of the Vickrey auction) that renders it efficient under the same conditions as the modified Vickrey auction. In fact, this modified English auction extends to multiple (identical) units, as long as buyers' marginal valuations are decreasing in the number of units consumed (in the multiunit case, the Perry-Reny auction is actually a modification of the Ausubel (1997) generalization of the English auction).
Multiple Goods
In the same way that the ordinary Vickrey auction extends to multiple goods via the GrovesClarke mechanism, so our modified Vickrey auction can be extended to handle more than one good.
It is simplest to consider the case of two buyers, 1 and 2, and two goods, A and B. If there were private values, the pertinent information about buyer i would consist of three numbers, Similarly, the proper generalization of (5) is the requirement that if, for given signal values, two allocations of goods are equally efficient (i.e., give rise to the same sum of valuations), then an increase in s i leads the allocation that buyer i prefers to become the more efficient. That is, for all , 2 , 1 = i and any two allocations ( (26) v where it is no longer uniquely efficient to allocate buyer 1 good A (i.e., it becomes equally efficient to allocate A to buyer 2) and have him pay his marginal impact at It can be shown (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ) that it is an equilibrium for buyers to bid truthfully in the above auction, i.e., for each i and bundle of goods ,
if buyer i's signal value is s i . Notice that if, in fact, buyers are truthful, the auction results in an efficient equilibrium.
Multidimensional Signals
Up until now, the results I have quoted on efficient auctions with common values have assumed that buyers' signals are one-dimensional. This is for good reason-the results are simply not true otherwise. Indeed, with multidimensional signals, efficiency in the sense I have defined it is generally unattainable with any mechanism (a point found in Maskin (1992) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) 
Notice that we have reduced the two-dimensional signal s 1 to the one-dimensional signal r 1 .
Furthermore, provided that α,β, and γ are all less than 1 (so that condition (5) holds), our modified Vickrey auction is efficient with respect to the "reduced" valuation functions summing to the same r 1 (in the terminology of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) , the auction is "incentive efficient").
Unfortunately, as Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) Notice that buyer 1's objective function does not depend on s 1B (s 1B affects only buyer 1's valuation for good B, but buyer 1 is not allocated B in either case (i) or (ii)). Hence, the equilibrium outcome of any auction cannot turn on the value of this parameter. But this means that, if an auction is efficient, which of case (i) or (ii), (i.e., which of (35) or (36)) holds cannot depend on s 1B . We conclude, from the right-hand sides of (35) , . Hence, in any auction, the equilibrium outcome must be the same for any value of ∆. In particular, if the auction is efficient, whether (42) or (43) applies cannot depend on ∆'s value. But from the right-hand sides of (42) and (43) 
The necessary conditions (37) and (44), due to Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) , are certainly restrictive. Nevertheless, as shown in Eso and Maskin (2000a) , there is a natural class of cases in which they are automatically satisfied. Specifically, suppose that in our two-good model, each buyer wants at most one good (this is not essential). Assume that the true value of good A to buyer i, y iA , is the sum of a component z A common to all buyers and a component of z iA that is idiosyncratic to him. It can be shown (see Eso and Maskin (2000a) (44) are automatically satisfied and the modified Groves-Clarke mechanism discussed in Section 6 is an efficient auction.
Further Work
There is clearly a great deal of work remaining to be done on efficient auctions, including dealing with the multiple good/multidimensional problem in cases where (37) and (44) .
